the extent and character or that regula o tion is w'hat is at issue. This paper (I) suggests the extension of the public utility concept to the national defense indus~ try of airframe rJ1anufacture, and (2) argues for bold institutional inventiveness in the elaboration of the yardstick principle of regulation and social control of_~isting utilities through regiona1izing state regulatory commissions.
Old lVine 7 Old Bottles
Independent comrnissioll regulation is of course only one form of many in the matter of public control-administrative regulation by boards, departments, agen~ cies of myriad types and topics characterizes the business scene. It is "widely felt that the regulatory process has largely become an ubiquitous element in national life and that most signs point to its continuance and extension. 1 And while government activity (generally la~ beled "participation" by supporters and "interference" by detractors) often ad- it was but did much to support the fact that it ""as assuredly a legal creation$ not to say legal fiction. Then the Nebbia Case in 1934 marked. the passing of the public utility concept-it is persuasively argued-by finding that whether or not the mill<. business was a public utility it is affected with the public interest and the legislature could fix prices in the industry without contravening the Fourteenth Amendment:4. For our purposes, how'ever, the Nehbia Case can conversely be looked on, not as killing the concept but rather allowing for its expansion, for now it was left to the legislatures to decide 'which industries should be so blessed.
'Vhatever its imprecision in legal terms, the public utility concept has been given in the literature of the period anlple definition in social science terms. Characteristically the buyer is disadvantaged in facing t..h.e seller in that the service (perhaps product?) is essential, bought continuously by many small consu~ers with urgent needs that are not postponable, and has no acceptable alternatives. Further, internal cost structures of the firm-fixed and variable cost relationships, economies of scale-and resource duplication are generally to be considered in appraising a candidate for utility regulation. The summary point is that the economist, while admitting a lack of neatness in· the distinction be~ tween utility and non~utility categories) finds "a social evaluation of private industries that is based more on the managerial behavior and the social significance of the industries than on the technical chara,cteristics of utility markets and services. oto But it is to these two aspects-social significance, and technic cal firm and market characteristics-that the case for extending the public utility concept to the airframe manufacturers is tied.
New l'Vine, Old Tasters
A slight disclaimer is perhaps in order at the outset~ This appraisal of the airframe companies in terms of the traditional tests for public utilities is designed to be illustrative of the kind of analysis necessary to make such a determination and is not intended to be definitive on such a large and complex matter. The fact remains, however, that the public utility concept has occasionally been referenced or obtusely hinted at in connection with the aircraft industry and surely The fact that historically only the service indu~tries have CaIne under the utility rtrnbrella seems to present no special problem to the standard. For one thing, since the Nebbia Case, serious doubt has been cast on the legal exclusion of product industries; -for another, whether a product or a service is at issue is surely not a key determinant in the essentiality aspect of the standard; and finally, it could be argued broadly that what the airframe manufacturers produce after all is a service ...... that of national security. lYforeover, felV' would contend that the service is not of unusual public significance and apparent, long-lasting dura~ tion. In fact, on the former point, on one occasion in 1962 in a court case involv~ ing the Boeing Company (supra" footnote 5,) government lawyers cited Munn vs. Illinois in laheling the contractor's business as lUaffected with a public interest." (It is, of course, very doubtful that the government 1,,-as prepared to accept all the institutional changes that its line of argument there implied but the point of this section is that perhaps it should.) On the latter point-the length of the Cold "Var-while one might make the case that giving any quasi-government permanence to a substantial part of the armaments industry would play into the harlds of those who characterize the United States as a "warfare state" and would be hurtful to any anTIS control and disarmament climate, the case might equally be made that even an arms can· trol agreement would not necessarily lessen significantly the national demands on the industry in terms of exotic inspection vehicles and apparatus.
Before attempting any appraisal of the airframe industry it is necessary to set out some of its distinguishing features. The industry is effectively comprised of nine companies: Boeing, Convair, Doug· las, Lockheed, M~rtin, McDonnell. North American, Northrop, and Repub: lie. They receive annually about thirty per cerit of the military procurement dollar for the research, design, develop~ ment and production of aircraft, missile assemblies, and electronic systems~ attesting to the well known heavy concentration'in the defense industry. Military sales as a per cent of total sales are extremely high (almost 100% in some cases) and those that have significant commercial sales can, 'with some cost-assignability problems, sort these activities out. Government furnished equipment (GFE) in the form of plant and equipment is very substantial and from this it has fol~ lowed that, while profits as a per cent of sales are relatively modest 1 they are highly favorable when figured-as they properly should be-on return on the investment. 7 skills and preparation> presentation, and l'epresen~tion are critical. As with pro~ duction economies of scale, this may serve as an effective barrier to entry. And . though ease of entry is not characteristic of the industry, involuntary exit is extremely low. Thus ,vhile it is a widely held belief that the airframe industry is very risky because of internal uncertainties of the unpredictability of Research and Development outcomes and external vagaries of doctrinal shifts, ready capital flows into the industry, earninw. are strong and government-procurement polic~es are decidedly favorable to the weapons firms bringing this view of riskiness into real question. 8 Finally, the buyer-seller relationship' betw"een the government and tl1e industry and within the industry as to price, product, and performance is essentially non-market in character.
How wen, then, might the industry Ufit The boundaries of the industry would have to be delineated in the legislation and a regulatory commission and staff set up-perhaps somewhat along the lines of the Atomic Energy Commission. The aiL-frame companies could either be required to purchase the existing government-furnished plant and equipment and include this in their rate base to be earned upon-or required to continue w'ith their existing facilities .. earning a lower rate of return on them with sonle small provision made for the management of the GFE facilities. The determination of allowable operating costs, of the rate base "used and useful" in doing business, and of the rate of return which would allow earnings that would attract , , new capital, would hecoJne the falniliar task of the regulatory commission. And all this consistent with satisfactory stand· ards of product performance .
The results to be hoped for are those . approximating the venerable tests of workable competition: prices that show a reasonable relation to costs; earnings which show a reasonable relation to risk; efficiency in resource allocation through, for example, avoiding the competitive excesses of hoarding technical personnet squandering scarce creative. skills., and duplicating research and design efforts; and innovational advances by removing the pressures toward preoccupation with tangible and immediate production con .. sequences in the firm's development efforts. For labor it could mean stable employment at a longqrun maximum average wage; for management luore stable earnings prospects; and for the public a minimum long~run price and high quality product.
Such treatment.of tl:te airframe manu· facturers would place them midway between the arsenal concept 'with its direct government ownership and their present private but privileged position. Making them public utilities might secure the best of both 'worlds for the country at large-for Whose benefit~ ultimately,. na~ tional security expenditures are made. Surely any arrangements where disputes over the amount of excess profits realized by an airfraule cOlupany in a single year can range from zero to $20 million does not inspire great confidence in the pre~ cision of present statutory controls. 9 Cur~ rent revisions of procurement policies 8 Procurement policies here referred to include cost·reimbursement type contractsJ spreading of con· tracts 6 cancellation penalty provisions and the advent of weapon system manager and single source procurement arrangements. and practices 111ay relieve some of the grosser problems noted but this proposal suggests a whole new institutional arrangement.
New JiVine} New Tasters
In the field of utility regulation, ne1V ideas are infrequent in generation and interminably slow in implementation. The twin obstacles of institutional inertia and active disinterest· are formidable indeed. A persistent criticism is properly levied that commissions act only in neg~ ative (or passive) fashion-regulating only profits and preoccupied with property rights, accounting procedures and ! :reporting forms; thus abdicate entirely fTom any creative role of directing and shaping the character of the industries regulated. This need not be so for the opportunities for institutional inventiveness and innovational regulation are many and the need for a utility industry coaxed, c~joled-even coerced-toward social objectives that are essential to a ITlodern mature economy is great. Bold experimentation is thus called for in schemes of both direct and indirect con· trols. One of these is the further elaboration of the yardstick method of regulation.
The doctrine of yardstick regulation was formulated to achieve some. sort of measuring device for the making of public policy regarding efficiency, quality of service, and reasonable prices in the affected industries. Also the existence of a public enterprise, e.g., a municipal electric plant or a TVA, in an area alongside private plants in the same service industrv has had the residual effect of depressing rates to consumers of the private service-another type of regulation by force of example. 10 It is here proposed that we consider nationalizing (with appropriate compensation, of course) one East-'\Vest and one North-South railroad and one transcontinental and one feeder airline for purposes of finally getting at the actual experience data essential to optimum regulatory policy and, if the operating experience so indicated, keeping rail and air transport rates "in line" at reasonably low leve1s.l1 From this experiment would hopefully flow significant data on operating costs under varying conditions, the shape of the illusive long-run average cost curve, and the applicability of the economies-of-scale argument to the industries. On the demand side a shaft of light could be shed on the relative elasticities of the services, their substitutab iIi ties, the effects of experimental pricing or earnings, and even a possible resolution of the long-standing argu~ ments in the literature on marginal cost pricing in the transport industry. It would provide "living laboratories" for the introduction of innovational. devices and policies and organizational arrange~ ments previously untested or inadequately tried~ including nlatters of facilities design (e.g., freight and passenger terminals) and managerial controls. Finally, to the extent that the operation of these enterprises provided reliable data for commissions to use in regulation and at the same time had the ilnplicit effect of depressing transport rates and enhancino-service, the idea is consistent o with the thought expressed in Professor 10 Depressed rates is here equated with increased corporate welfare as wen as increased consumer welfare for the total receipts; and savings of the private plants have generally risen as a result of the elasticities involved.
11 Choosing one East·,\Vest and one North-South railroad is, of course, designed to get at operating experiences-climate, terrain, traffic flows, etc. For the same reason one transcontinenta.l and one feeder airline are suggested for experimentation.
LAND ECONOrvHCS
James Bonbright's famous phrase, "the minimum squawk theory of regulation."
A second suggested institutional innovation is the abandoning of the traditional form of state regulatory conlmis-,sion.s. The inauspicious history of the state-commission concept with its more recent distortions and deterioration of effectiveness-some . would say decline and fall-is often cited and well documented in the scholarly literEiture on the subject. The problem is in part the conservatIsm of the courts, more the inade-. quacy or the legislation, and most of all the quality of the q)mmis~ioners and their staffs.
The axiom that every state must have its own commission and policies for the regulation of electric and telephone come panies-which are generally organized on an interstate basis-deserves re-examination and may well turn out to be an encumbering fiction. Surely the New England states have more in common from a regulatory standpoint than they have in' differences: likewise the Rocky Ivlountain, the Pacific and the South~ . 1vester£1 states. Regional public utility commISSIons, then, could be organized so as to reflect reasonable operational commonality much as motor rate bureaus and the Federal Reserve Banks have been districted. 12 This arrangement would permit the regional standardiza., tion of regulatory policies and the equal~ ization of their effects between states within the region; would provide larger appropriations for the hiring of a: larger and more competent> staff; would allow large-scale . economies . of control not available to state commissions; would insulate commissions from harmful local pressures; and would enhance the com~ missions' position by making them more the equal of the industries they are de .. signed to regulate.
It is all too true that sound, socially effective" rational regulation is not realiz .. able through quick leaps but rather is evolved in faltering stops and starts. Yet after thirty years of relative dormancy. it may be timely to try a few' new steps.
